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When you last read a literary novel or watched a challenging fi ction fi lm—say, Tolstoy’s 
Anna Karenina or Welles’ Citizen Kane—did you learn anything substantive about the 
real world? Did you come to know or understand important things of which you were 
previously ignorant? Many people would answer such questions affi  rmatively and 
as suredly: “Of course I did! How could I not learn something important about human 
aff airs by engaging with these monumental works of human creativity?” If pressed to say 
what exactly it is that they learned, however, their answer would likely be neither assured 
nor very exact. Th ey might claim to have gained insight into something called “the human 
condition.” Or perhaps they will suggest that they now know, in some richer and fuller 
sense, how power corrupts.
Gregory Currie, a professor of philosophy at the University of York, thinks not. In 
Imagining and Knowing: Th e Shape of Fiction, he takes critical aim at the many ambitious 
claims that have been made for fi ction’s educative potential—its capacity to reveal deep 
human truths, build skills, and refi ne sensibilities. He starts by noting an evidential double 
standard: 
Th ose who condemn various kinds of fi ction as leading to ignorance, error, or bad behav-
iour are rightly challenged to provide evidence for their claims, and the few philosophers 
who have taken up the cause have generally been careful to seek evidential support for 
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their case. By contrast, we fi nd books extolling the improving powers of fi ction which fail 
to provide, or even consider providing, any evidence. (p. 5)
Most of the book is devoted to critical discussion of what would count as good evidence 
that we learn valuable lessons from media fi ctions, and to showing that, in many cases, 
there are philosophical and psychological reasons to be skeptical that we do. “One reason 
for a cautious attitude to the idea that we learn from fi ction,” as Currie rightly notes, “is 
that we want it to be true” (p. 4). Other reasons range from the analytic and concep-
tual to the grittily empirical. Currie argues, for example, that our fi ctional engagements 
are often marked by low epistemic vigilance. We are typically not motivated to inquire 
into whether this or that depicted experience is actually anything like the real deal. 
Compounding the issue, fi ction’s institutional structures—its departments, its publi-
shing practices, its awards—are generally not very concerned with the truthfulness and 
verisimili tude of narrative depictions. Or at least they are nowhere near as concerned 
with truth as are the institutions of science. On the empirical side of things, Currie shows, 
among other things, that the oft-touted causal link between narrative experience and 
empathy is actually weak and tenuous.
Th ese arguments notwithstanding, many people are genuinely convinced that they 
learn important lessons from fi ction. Are they fooling themselves? Currie’s surprising 
answer is that they may well be, literally! His argument—the book’s weakest—starts with 
the philosophically respectable idea that fi ctional engagements involve
a pretence that is carried on in imagination rather than acted out in behaviour […] What 
I suggest now is that fi ction engages us in a further act of pretending: the pretence that 
we are learning from the story, not just about its characters and their doings, but, in some 
indirect way, about things which lie beyond the events and characters of its story, which 
are suggested by them and which may be intended to be communicated by means of the 
story. (p. 107)
I fi nd this suggestion puzzling. To what presumed fact about human psychology would 
the claim correspond? As Currie realizes, friends of learning from fi ction certainly do not 
believe that their own learning is merely pretended. What fact about them makes them 
pretend, then? As far as I was able to tell, Currie does not identify such a fact. He does, 
however, provide two considerations in favor of his suggestion. Th e fi rst is that when we 
pretend that fi ctional characters exist and interact, “we are naturally led to include within 
the scope of the pretense a wider range of pretended learning that takes in the sorts of 
things we often claim that fi ction really can teach us” (p. 108). In other words, the pre-
tended learning may just come along for the ride. But the fact that something is learned 
within the scope of some pretense does not show that the learning is itself pretended. 
Currie’s second point is that “as theories of what we might call broadly artistic engage-
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make the suggestion true. In the end, I doubt there is much substance to the idea that 
learning from fi ction is a form of pretense.   
Some critics might fault the book for a lack of focus. Part I looks closely at the connec-
tion between fi ction and the imagination, whereas parts II and III deal with the connec-
tion between fi ction and knowledge. Th ose are very diff erent sorts of connection, in that 
the former is entirely internal to the fi ctional engagement whereas the latter is not. How-
ever, the arguments made in the two latter parts lean on the conceptual groundwork 
set out in the fi rst part, where Currie convincingly refutes recent attempts to discount 
or defl ate the role of the imagination in our fi ctional engagements. It is precisely because 
fi ction relies on the imagination, and because there is no simple route from imagining to 
knowing, that learning from fi ction proves such a vexing question.
Still, in this reviewer’s judgment, the affi  nity between fi ction and the imagination 
may also provide some grounds for optimism. For perhaps it is exactly by expanding our 
imaginative capacities that fi ctions earn their esteem. How fi ctions might do this remains 
understudied, both philosophically and psychologically. We need to know much more 
about how diff erent media may guide or “scaff old” the human imagination—not just 
how they work, but how they work on us. Such imaginings as are licensed by fi lm are 
mainly and richly cognitive; they are about perceiving and understanding what happens 
on the screen. By contrast, video games may also accommodate the user’s conative states 
to generate self-involving, desire-driven imaginings. Film and video games thus scaff old 
the human imagination in very diff erent ways. If indeed fi ctions teach us anything useful 
and important, those teachings should have something to do with the disparate kinds 
of imagining licensed by their implementing media. And if indeed any such teachings go 
through the imagination, then it might be worth focusing, fi rst, on fi ction’s eff ects on the 
imagination, before then deciding where and when we should expect to fi nd any behav-
ioral evidence. 
Imagining and Knowing represents a strong challenge to weakly supported claims 
for the educative powers of fi ction. While the book focuses on literature and fi lm, it is a 
worthwhile read for any media scholar with a general interest in its subject.
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